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THE UNITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: A COMMENT ON ERNEST
CALDWELL'S'HORIZONTAL RIGHTS AND CHINESE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: JUDICIALIZATION THROUGH LABOR
DISPUTES'
ARIF A. JAMAL*
INTRODUCTION

Ernest Caldwell wants to defend Chinese constitutionalism from
criticism, coming, it seems largely at least, from Western constitutional
scholars or scholars who hold up Western constitutional patterns as an
ideal. Specifically, he seeks to defend the Chinese constitutional order
from the charge that it is fundamentally flawed in not possessing a
mechanism for judicial review of the kind found in some Western constitutional regimes, and in particular in the United States.1 His argument, if I have understood it correctly, is that constitutional
judicialization (which prizes judicial review and vertical rights) fails to
acknowledge an intrinsic virtue of Chinese constitutionalism, which
protects horizontal rights (as evidenced especially in the labor dispute
cases he discusses).2
I think it is fair to say that Caldwell is making both a 'comparative'
claim and a 'value' claim. The comparative claim is that Chinese constitutional law must be understood on its own terms and that on these
terms it does protect rights, even if it does not do so in the same way as
Western constitutional laW.3 The value claim is that the procedures in
China's legal system satisfy value concerns captured in the term 'constitutionalism' because they show how that system respects the supremacy of constitutional norms in a way that, though different from,
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1. Ernest Caldwell, HorizontalRights and Chinese Constitutionalism,88 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 63
(2012).
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is not inferior to Western constitutionalism.4 In this response, I want to
take up and challenge both the comparative and the value claims. In
particular, I want to argue, first, that one need not adopt the perspective that Chinese constitutional law must be seen entirely on its own
terms and in a way that cannot be compared with Western models
without generating misunderstanding (for this I rely upon the work of
Chinese and other constitutional scholars) and, second, that Caldwell is
mistaken in thinking that the value of judicial review can be satisfied
by the horizontal rights review he finds in Chinese constitutional law.
Instead, I argue that judicial review cannot be replaced by horizontal
review based on a 'unity of value' argument (for this I use recent work
by Ronald Dworkin).
I.

SOME POINTS IN THE ARGUMENT

begin by highlighting a few key parts of Caldwell's argument.
Caldwell states that in place of judicial review, which China does not
have, it has "an alternative system which the Chinese call constitutional
supervision."s This system locates constitutional enforcement within
the legislative, not judicial, branch of government: "However, the constitution does not stipulate the method of enforcement nor what, specifically, enforcement actually entails."6 He continues: "[fjurther
complicating the matter is the complex relationship between the judiciary and the constitution, which at best can be characterized as ambiguous or at worst contradictory."7 This leads Caldwell to conclude
that "there is no governmental body independent of the NPC [National
People's Congress; a legislative body] to hold the NPC accountable for
actions that contravene the constitutional rights of Chinese citizens."a
Although some (as he notes) might conclude that the Chinese legal
system lacks any idea of constitutionalism, Caldwell finds a sufficient
sense of constitutionalism in the system's recognition of horizontal
rights. He states:
This single-axis perspective of [vertical] rights conflict, however,
typically precludes an examination of constitutional development
and constitutional engagement along alternative axes, namely the
horizontal enforcement of constitutionally enshrined rights. Within
horizontal conflict, constitutional norms transition from defensive to
I

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id at 67.
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positive individual rights, and the role of the state transitions from
the source of the threat to an agent enforcing the constitutionalrights
of a citizen.9
This perspective is about understanding China and its constitutional system on its own terms and especially in terms that are "not
overly confined by Amero-centric understanding of constitutional development and design."io Moreover, he emphasizes the importance of
"examining different types of rights which may be valued differently
within political regimes not conforming to the liberal democratic paradigm."11 So, in summary, his points seem to be (i) do not use (overly)
Western criteria in considering China; and, (ii) appreciate the different
values that the Chinese system advances. Taken together these constitute the basis of Caldwell's argument for the existence of Chinese constitutionalism.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS: POSSIBILITIES OF COMPARISON

In a recent work, Albert Chen identifies the elements of constitutionalism as including "rule of law, the separation of powers, political
checks and balances civil liberties, a written constitution, review of the
constitutionality ofgovernmental actions, and peaceful transfer of power in accordance with constitutional norms."12 Chen surveys several
countries in South and East Asia, including the People's Republic of
China (PRC), to illustrate that while, obviously, they do not all have
similar constitutional structures, nor even what he calls similar constitutional 'pathways', nonetheless:
Constitutionalism, albeit originating in the Western world, seems to
have a universal appeal and to address the fundamental problems of
governance, government, and political power in many modern societies in Asia. A macrohistorical perspective, covering developments in
Asia since the late nineteenth century, suggests that constitutionalism has broadened and deepened its reach, significantly, over the
course of time ... No distinctly Asian mode of constitutionalism or

political-constitutional practices can be identified. Nor is there evi-

9. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
10.
11.
12.
parative

Id. at9l.
Id at 90.
Albert H. Y. Chen, Pathways of Western liberal constitutional development in Asia: A comstudy of five major nations, 8(4) INT'L J. OF CONST. L. 849, 849-50 n.1 (2010) (emphasis

added) (note also that Chen cites in his first footnote a piece by Carlos Santiago Nino, which looks
at various meanings of constitutionalism and suggests that some of the meanings include judicial
review. See cARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOcRACY 3 (Yale Univ.
Press 1996)).
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dence that Asian culture and values are particularly resistant to constitutionalism.13
Chen is making two related points. The first is that constitutionalism has universal appeal (a point about the idea). The second is that
the idea of constitutionalism can be realized or practiced in different
ways (a point about the form). Additionally, it is important to note that
Chen grounds these claims on a description of constitutionalism in
practice as including, inter alia, separation of powers and review of the
constitutionality of governmental actions. And all of this on Chen's
reckoning has universal appeal, including within Asia. To be clear and
fair to Chen's analysis as well as to the general point I am pursuing
here, Chen notes that the pattern of constitutionalism in Asia is not
identical and that some jurisdictions represent what he calls "classical
constitutionalism" (CC), constitutionalism properly so-called; others
"party-state constitutionalism" (PS); and still others "hybrid constitutional practices" (HC).14 The PRC system in this schema is a PS constitutional order, as compared to Taiwan, which Chen describes as a CC
order. He notes that "in the PRC, the Constitution is implemented, principally, through the making and enforcement of laws"is and that "the
constitutional function of the Chinese courts is solely to try cases in
accordance with the law."16 Chen's assertion therefore is not that there
is a singular constitutional form in Asia, but rather, that there is no
distinctively Asian constitutional mode; the paradigm of constitutionalism and its values and principles as it developed in the West has been
taken up, in some places and to some extent, in Asian contexts.
A similar theme can be found in the work of Qianfan Zhang. Zhang
repeats Chen's concern about the current state of constitutionalism in
China, stating simply that "having a constitution is not the same as
making it work. Mainland China exemplifies this conventional wisdom," or, later and more bluntly, "[b]y Western standards, China's constitution is a dead letter."17 While noting, therefore, that the official
system has a constitution but not constitutionalism, Zhang finds that
there is a populist path of constitutionalism in China outside of the
official structures. It is too much to say that this populist path leads to
full-blown constitutionalism, however, since, as Zhang notes, its impact
13. Id. at 884.
14. Id. at 880.
15. Id. at 878.
16. Id. at 879.
17. Qianfan Zhang, A Constitution Without Constitutionalism? The Paths of Constitutional
Development in China, 8(4) INT'L J.CONST. L.950, 950, 952 (2010).
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might be viewed as minimal. Yet it "has made [a] decisive difference in
certain situations."18 Moreover, on Zhang's analysis, populist pressure
appears to generate a type of inertial force for constitutionalism, since
he notes that when the national government promulgates progressive
laws, there is popular pressure to enforce these norms.19
Popular support is not, however, evenly spread since Zhang notes
it does not seem to extend to criminal due proceSS.20 Nor is it stimulating quick change, as China's progress on the path towards constitutionalism is very slow. Zhang's conclusion is that the realization of
proper constitutionalism in China will require institutional arrangements including, but not limited to, judicial review supported by active
citizens willing to insist on their rights.21
Based on these claims, we can read Zhang's analysis as supporting
the cultural viability of constitutionalism (or, perhaps better, the viability of constitutionalism culturally) in China in two ways. First, Zhang
wants us to understand and appreciate the popular support for constitutionalism that exists, albeit imperfectly and not always with great
effect, among the Chinese people. Second, Zhang - himself a professor
of law at Peking University - expresses support for specific forms of
constitutional arrangements, including judicial review, among thoughtful Chinese legal actors.
This reiterates the idea, mentioned above, that constitutionalism
is not as alien a value in the Chinese context at it might seem at either
the popular or the academic level. Indeed, in response to a critique of
his article by Michael Dowdle, in which Dowdle suggests that Zhang
overemphasizes the model of American-style constitutionalism and of
judicial review as a touchstone of constitutionalism,22 Zhang retorts
that he does not think that constitutionalism is a uniquely American
phenomenon, although he does "believe that 'real constitutionalism' in
China requires judicial review of some type... "23 He adds that "constitutionalism does not stand for any particular kind of constitutional
system, but it does stand for a system that gives meaning to the consti-

18. Id.at957.
19. Id. at 960.
20. Id. at 971.
21. Id. at 975-76.
22. Michael W. Dowdle, Of Comparative Constitutional Monocropping: A Reply to Qianfan
Zhang, 8(4) INT'L J.CONST. L. 977, 980-81 (2010).
23. Qianfan Zhang, Of Comparative Constitutional Monocropping: A Rejoinder to Michael
Dowdle, 8(4) INT'LJ. CONST. L.985, 986-87 (2010).
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tution by somehow making its words count."24 In some concession to
Dowdle's objection that Zhang's argument leads to constitutional
monocropping, Zhang responds that "if monocropping stands for a
category of developed constitutional systems, in which constitutions
are seriously implemented by judicial or other means, I do not see anything wrong with it."25
In other words, Zhang resists Dowdle's (and perhaps Caldwell's)
perspective that suggests that China's constitutional norms must be
understood without reference to ideas or standards coming from the
West. Zhang does not say that the American (or any other Western)
model is what China will or must pursue, but he would resist the argument that constitutional values derived from, or inspired by, these
systems are not appropriate for China, notwithstanding that these values may be expressed in particular institutional forms requiring some
form of judicial revieW.26
In a nuanced comparative piece that considers East Asian constitutionalism by examining the constitutional orders of Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan, Jiunn-Rong Yeh and Wen-Chen Chang assess the
constitutional values these orders represent individually and regionally.27 They note that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are widely recognized as constitutional democracies and are indeed functioning as
such.28 They further note that many scholars from these countries
embrace a universalistic view of democratic constitutionalism and
human rights and stress that societies of East Asia or Asia as a whole
exhibit the same capability to reflect upon universal human rights
values as other societies and cultures. These scholars deem the current constitutional progress in East Asia worthy of dialogue and of
eventual convergence with the values held by advanced constitutional democracies in the West.29
However, they continue:
[o]thers, however, recognize Confucianism as a distinctive tradition
shared by most states in East Asia and seek to emphasize comparable liberal elements in those ancient teachings that may provide a
solid foundation for democratic institutions and modern principles
of rule of law and constitutionalism.30
24. Id.
25. Id. at 987.
26. See generally id.
27. Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of East Asian Constitutionalism:
Featuresin Comparison, 59 AM. J.COMP. L. 805 (2011).
28. Id. at 807-08.
29. Id. at 809-10.
30. Id. at 810.
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The latter outlook grounds the so-called 'Asian values' perspective.
Yeh and Chang, while noting in some detail different legal structures in East Asia, nevertheless assert that whether it is "[e]ssential to
constitutionalism or not, judicial review has become a popular mechanism in maintaining and strengthening constitutional rule of law, especially in new or recently revived constitutions."1 Even though the
paths taken in the countries they study have not, however, been the
same as those of the West, "they have all successfully attained liberal
constitutionalism, whose specific arrangements may differ from those
in the West... "32 They acknowledge, however that the "the differences
are admittedly a matter of degree."33 Yeh and Chang conclude that
although the East Asian model is distinct, it is neither ignorant of nor
hostile to all the constitutional values coming from the West, nor, on
the contrary, is it defined by 'Asian values':
The perceived Asian value of "state before self' notwithstanding,
East Asian constitutional developments have been focused on constraining government power, protecting individual rights (especially
of women and children) and have given voice to a vibrant civil society. Judicial statements in individual cases did not elevate collective
values or public morality over civil and political rights. To the contrary, the three courts ... had no hesitation to prioritize rights of in-

dividuals over collective morals or values.34
Admittedly, Yeh and Chang did not include China in their East
Asian survey, though of course by including Taiwan they did include a
Chinese culture. They do not conclude that East Asia is following, or
should follow, the West. What they do say, however, is that constitutionalism and its values - including the importance of judicial review have been recognized in East Asia both by scholars and by courts, and
that too much can be made of Asian particularism, normatively and
descriptively.35 One can conclude from their survey that although East
Asia may be different, one can discuss constitutionalism in similar
normative terms, recognizing, as Zhang does, that one does not have to
reject as culturally inappropriate or incomprehensible constitutional
values whose origins may lie in the West.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 823.
Id. at 835.
Id
Id at 838.
See id.at 839.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: DIFFERENT IS NOT EQUAL

My second concern is Caldwell's effort to defend Chinese constitutionalism on the basis of horizontal rights. I do not disagree that horizontal rights make an important contribution to the legal system and
provide values that contribute to constitutionalism. Indeed, I think
Caldwell's paper is to be appreciated for the careful and thoughtful
manner in which it brings out this point. My contention, however, is
that horizontal rights cannot substitute for judicial review. Let me outline a theoretical line of argument (not my own) that I believe provides
grounds for making this claim. Ronald Dworkin famously resisted the
legal positivist assertion that there is no necessary connection between
law and morality, arguing on the contrary that law is an interpretive
exercise in which moral judgments are always being made, even if not
always acknowledged.36 In a more recent work, Justice for Hedgehogs,37 Dworkin argues for the unity of value, or at least of ethical and
moral values.38 As in his previous work, he describes law as a branch
of morality, saying that "law is a branch of political morality, which
itself is a branch of a more general theory of personal morality, which
is in turn a branch of a yet more general theory of what it is to live
well."39 Making this claim more concrete in political and legal terms, he
argues that
no government is legitimate unless it subscribes to two reigning
principles. First, it must show equal concern for the fate of every
person over whom it claims dominion. Second, it must respect fully
the responsibility and right of each person to decide for himself how
to make something valuable of his life.40
I want to make two, related, arguments from this Dworkinian perspective. The more specific and legal argument is that these reigning
principles require, even demand, that we have a mechanism to hold
government accountable for any breaches of these principles and indeed to be able allege such breaches. To this end, the process of judicial

36. The Dworkinian perspective receives its fullest exposition in RONALD DWORKIN LAW'S
EMPIRE (1998). See e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hart'sPostscriptand the Character of Political Philosophy,
24 OXFORD J.OF LEGAL STUD. 1-37 (2004). Dworkin is of course responding primarily to Hart's, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW. Hart says that "though there are many different contingent connections between
law and morality there are no necessary conceptual connections between the content of law and
morality; and hence morally iniquitous provisions may be valid as legal rules or principles." H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 268 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2nd ed. 1997).
37. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (Belknap/Harvard Univ. Press, 2011).

38. Id.at 1.
39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 2.

2012]

THE UNITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

113

review seems one of the best options we have. Through judicial review,
we have the capacity for a variable range of legal remedies, including
ultra vires declarations, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, etc. Indeed, it is difficult to think of another legal tool which offers such scope
and range for testing and challenging the role of government. Horizontal rights may offer some form of enforcement of constitutional norms,
but they do not present the panoply of options that judicial review
makes available. This is crucial if we believe, as Dworkin does, in the
importance of the principles he articulates. The second, more general
point, is that Dworkin's unity of value argument suggests that we
should not see the absence of some values as being compensated for by
the presence of others; the argument does not allow us to pick and
choose but insists, I think, that we take them as a whole. Thus, the values of constitutionalism may not be fully defined by judicial review.
But, judicial review does form an important part of the equation and its
value is understandable, and in fact understood, in East Asia, specifically in China, at both a scholarly and (less precisely) a popular level. I
would go even further - adopting the criteria that Yeh and Chang, as
well as Zhang and Chen, in slightly different ways, employ - to say that
although judicial review may not be sufficient, it is necessary if we are
to have constitutionalism in the proper sense of the term, precisely
because it offers so many legal possibilities to hold government accountable and therefore, to defend Dworkin's principles of legitimate
government. Judicial review therefore constitutes part of the unified
value set for constitutionalism, which cannot be separated out into its
component parts without doing great violence and severely compromising the value itself. The whole really is greater than the sum of its
parts.
CONCLUSION

Ernest Caldwell's paper presents a sympathetic and well-analyzed
account of the workings of Chinese public law. It makes clear that although China is without formal judicial review, and consequently, the
capacity to adjudicate vertical rights, the Chinese system is able to provide for horizontal rights and the constitutional protections that these
engender. That this feature of the system is part of China's constitutional order, and must be understood and appreciated for the contribution that it makes, is a point with which I have no quarrel. What I have
argued, however, is that, as useful as this analysis is, there is risk in its
overextension, culturally and normatively. In cultural terms, my point
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is that Asian contexts - including China itself - are not so culturally
impervious, nor so culturally self-contained, that we cannot reasonably
and usefully compare their constitutional system with that of other,
and in particular Western, contexts. To this end, I have sought support
from the views of scholars in East Asia who seem content to use the
analytical frameworks of, for example, judicial review and vertical
rights enforcement to assess China's constitutional system.
Moreover, as Zhang notes, the values associated with constitutionalism, understood as including judicial review, while not exclusively defined by it, have popular support in China.41 Other scholars, like
Yeh and Chang, find these values reflected within other East Asian legal
systems and, by including the case of Taiwan, in other Chinese cultural
systems as well.42 But let me be clear both about what I read from
these scholars and its implications. I do not read that East Asia or China
will follow Western constitutionalism, nor do I read that East Asia or
China must follow Western constitutionalism. Indeed, Yeh and Chang
are at some pains to assert that East Asia constitutional framework
should be seen as expressing its own style and not just part of "global
transnational constitutionalism."43 Nonetheless, what I do read is that
the terms of constitutional assessment and evaluation, including the
presence of judicial review, and the standards of constitutionalism that
these suggest, are viable in East Asian contexts.
This viability relates to the second point I have sought to make,
which is that Caldwell's essay seems to overextend the definition of
constitutionalism. Perhaps, in fact, this might be better characterized
as a thinning out of constitutionalism, so that a system where there is
no possibility for the courts to effectively make use of the constitution
to check governmental power might still be called constitutionalism.
My suggestion is that we should not be so ready to grace such a situation with the label of constitutionalism because that label should mean
something more normatively substantial. This is understood, so it appears to me, not only by scholars, but also by the peoples of Asia and of
the PRC itself. To this extent, it is a value proposition that we all can,
and should, take seriously.

41. Zhang, supra note 23, at 959.
42. Yeh & Chang, supra note 27, at 810, n.15.
43. Id. at 805, 839.

